José Joaquín de Mora was born into a bourgeois family during the reign of Carlos III. Educated in the principles of Catholic Enlightenment, and specifically linked to theological Jansenism, de Mora finished his legal degree in 1805 at the University of Granada, where, one year later, he was appointed professor of logic. In this chair, de Mora used the French philosopher Étienne Bonnot de Condillac as a guide, distancing himself from the influence of the dominant scholasticism in other Spanish universities. De Mora also taught law based on Jeremy Bentham's An Itroduction to the Principles of Moral and Legislation. Over time, de Mora not only maintained epistolary contact with Bentham but was also one of the promoters of utilitarianism in Latin America by translating some of his works. 

During the period of the liberal triennium (1820-1823), de Mora began teaching natural law in the patriotic literary academy El Ateneo. His work in this institution, whose purpose was to strengthen the constitutional regime of the monarchy, was complemented by his fertile journalistic activity. His interest included Francis Bacon’s work, the spread of ‘scientific modernity’, and the translation of political works. In a climate of liberalism and intellectual openness, de Mora translated Holbach and debated with important intellectuals of the time. 

In 1827, Mora was called by the governor of Buenos Aires, Bernardino Rivadavia. Since then, he undertook a series of reforms in various areas of knowledge – education, law, science, economy, and politic – in the republics of Argentina, Chile, Peru and Bolivia. His educational projects aimed to establish the principles of liberalism in South America. De Mora criticized the colonial system and the Hispanic legal sciences. In a clear contrast to the scholastic method used by the medieval jurisprudence, de Mora promoted the language of modern rational philosophy.

Hired by the Chilean government in 1828, Mora collaborated in drafting the Constitution of 1828, fostering the liberal political principles. De Mora taught natural law at the Liceo de Chile between 1829 and 1831. The legal curriculum consisted of the following subjects: natural law, law of nations, constitutional law, and Roman law. The textbooks for such subjects were the works of Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui and Emer de Vattel, the Constitution of the Republic, and Justinian’s Institutes. To prepare the subjects, de Mora wrote a handbook in seven volumes, titled Curso de Derechos del Liceo de Chile.

At the Ateneo del Perú high school, de Mora also taught natural law and public law in 1832. In 1834, the president of Bolivia, Andrés de Santa Cruz, invited him to teach literature at the University of La Paz. Returning to Spain, first in Cádiz and then in Madrid, de Mora continued to work on liberal economy and educational projects. In London, de Mora was first appointed representative of the Peruvian-Bolivian confederation (1838-1843). Then, in 1859, he was appointed diplomat representing Spain in London, where he remained until shortly before his death.

De Mora’s main work on natural law is Curso de Derechos del Liceo de Chile. The first two volumes on natural law and law of nations were published in 1830, while the volumes on Roman law reached the printing press in 1865. Mora's handbook was based on a summary of the work of the German jurist Johann Gottlieb Heineccius. De Mora was a follower of Heineccius because of the clarity with which he explained Roman legal matters. His goal was to replace the Roman legal handbook written by the seventeenth-century Dutch jurist Arnold Vinnius, which was used in Hispanic American universities. In 1832, de Mora published a handbook on logic and ethics, drawing on the works of several Scottish philosophers, including Smith, Reid, and Ferguson, among others.

In Curso de Derechos del Liceo de Chile, de Mora establishes that the study of natural law should contribute to reforming colonial legal studies, which were at the service of the monarchical system. In the nations of the New World, the legal profession had to serve the system of modern representative government. Thus, legal education had to leave behind the influence of medieval common law jurists and respond to the principles of modern science.

The laws of France and England were possible models, whereas Roman law no longer provided the basis for reform of a legal system characterised by confusion, enormous variety and general ignorance. And whereas moral philosophers reduced natural law to a science of the mind, it should rightly be a science of action. That required the approach of empirical sciences such as chemistry that derived laws from facts. Legal precepts would then be natural laws that demonstrated regular effects, so that the obligation of natural law would simply be a matter of observation.

As far as de Mora is concerned, there are two legal orders: the natural and the positive. Natural law is a regular order by which God governs the universe, and humanity understands this order through the senses and reason. In this sense, primitive natural law is the code of humanity’s duties, and its study corresponds to moral philosophy. Given that all science is based on the knowledge of facts, that is, on experience, de Mora argues that it is not possible to study the state of primitive society. Although there are no data on this savage state, it can be imagined that natural law is also in force: regarding divine worship, self-defence, the use of irrational things, and natural freedom. 

Through contracts, humanity can establish both family and civil society. The basis of the family is marriage, and the purpose of this institution is procreation. From the marriage contract, de Mora derives the rights of spouses to fidelity, cohabitation, and mutual services. De Mora opposes polygamy and divorce. Similarly, he outlined a series of rights and obligations between parents and children, without which the continuity of life would not be possible 

Regarding civil society, de Mora turned to utilitarianism, establishing that humanity seeks to increase pleasure and decrease deprivation. Given the weakness of their faculties, individuals need the cooperation of their peers. By giving up part of their independence, each individual enters into a primitive pact intended to establish reciprocity with respect to the life and property of every person. Civil society is founded on reciprocity. A second condition must also be met according to de Mora: a guarantee. For the agreement to be executed, an authority is needed that, through its powers of coercion, can guarantee compliance with the agreement. This superior force is a moral entity called society. 

Just as the law of gravity in physics constitutes an unquestionable principle, so too, for de Mora, is the law of freedom the foundational norm governing social life. The social state—emerging from the foundational pact—does not merely regulate freedom but brings it into being. Prior to this contractual framework, human conduct depended exclusively on the uncoordinated discretion of individuals. Within his legal philosophy, freedom is therefore defined as the capacity to act in ways that do not generate harm to the social body or to its members. Consequently, any legal norm or institutional arrangement that contravenes this criterion must be regarded as an infringement upon genuine freedom.

The second foundational principle of civil society is equality. Like freedom, equality does not exist in the state of nature but emerges exclusively through the establishment of a social agreement. The equality of human beings rests on the parity of their capacity for judgment and rational deliberation. In line with other jurists of his time, de Mora maintains that any positive law that undermines the freedom or equality inscribed in the natural order lacks legitimacy and therefore cannot be regarded as truly binding.

A third law of civil society is property. As far as de Mora is concerned, society born of a common pact cannot be sustained if the ownership of each individual’s acquisitions is not respected. Through labour, something that belongs to everyone comes to belong to only one. Following John Locke, de Mora argues that the legitimacy of the right to property is based on labour. Obligations also emanate from property ownership, such as the obligation to work, which is the basis of property. In addition, there is an obligation tied to possession: to be an owner, one must currently possess something. A third obligation is compensation for any damage to property. The most characteristic aspect of property law, according to his understanding, is inviolability. Among free people, property is unalterable, sacred, and constantly growing. Thus, trade is defined as the set of agreements through which individuals reciprocally transfer property.

According to de Mora, there are also natural rights of society. Society is a moral entity whose particular rights are similar to those of individuals, such as the defence of life. These natural rights also include freedom, understood as the right to organise and adopt the political regime that best suits it; equality, in the sense of making pacts and agreements with other societies and recognising the use of force for their fulfilment; and property.